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Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers:  
Theory with Application to Foreign Aid 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the  
composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this 
composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the 
recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a 
recipient’s moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. 
Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to 
construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient 
country and a donor to illustrate the donor’s optimal choice of tied (restricted) and 
untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient’s 
moral hazard behavior (i.e.,  improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in 
the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using 
data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors. 
 
 
 
Key words: tied foreign aid, governance, moral hazard, political agency, restricted 
transfer. 
JEL Classification: D73, F35, H87, I38. 
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“Rich countries pursue their own fixations and fads... They tie aid so that it can only 
be used to buy the donor’s own products or services – effectively reducing the value 
of aid by as much as 30 percent...” Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa (2005, p. 58) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The need to ensure that transfers reach their intended recipients (i.e., efficient 
targetting) is one of the cornestones of the information-based approach to public 
economics pioneered by Mirrlees (1971). In achieving this goal, it is well known that 
in-kind or restricted transfers may dominate unrestricted transfers. More specifically, 
restricted transfers lead to better targeting, reduce moral hazard behaviour, and relax 
self selection constraints; see, for example, Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Besley and 
Coate, 1991, 1992; Bruce and Waldman, 1991; Coate, 1989, 1995; Blackkorby and 
Donaldson, 1988; Boadway, 1997, 1998; and Gahvari and Enlinson, 2007).1 
However, a disadvantage of in-kind or restricted transfers is that they may be 
associated with deadweight losses since the donor may have incomplete information 
about the preferences of the recipient or may narrow the recipient’s consumption set 
relative to his consumption set if the transfers were in cash.2 
 The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the  
composition of unrestricted cash and in-kind (restricted) transfers to a recipient and 
how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior 
                                                 
1 In Besley and Coate (1991) only in-kind transfers are used. Gahvari and de Mattos (2007) show that 
combining conditional cash transfers with in-kind transfers in the Besley and Coate (1991) model 
reduces or eliminates the deadweight losses of in-kind transfers. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) also combine cash and in-kind transfers. 
2 This need not be the case, though (e.g., Moffitt, 1989). In Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) there are 
deadweight losses, even if the transfers are in cash. This is because to satisfy self-selection constraints 
and thus qualify for a cash transfer, it is necessary to introduce distortions into the recipient’s labor 
supply, such that by earning income below a certain threshold his type is revealed. In Moffitt (1983), 
cash transfers lead to deadweight losses because the recipients suffer from a stigma of being on public 
assistance (i.e., welfare stigma). 
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of the recipient. The analysis is general but it is couched within the specific context of 
foreign aid.  
While it is widely known and accepted that restricted transfers may be used to 
control moral hazard behavior, we are not aware of any tests of an implication of this 
dictum, namely that the proportion of restricted or in-kind transfers in total transfers 
must fall as the incidence of moral hazard behavior on the part of the recipient falls. 
In foreign aid, the World Bank recognizes this point when it recommends that “[i]n a 
country with sound public expenditure management, a larger portion of aid can be in 
the form of general budget support (i.e., untied aid). This recognizes the reality of 
fungibility and economizes on the administrative costs of aid.” (World Bank, 1998, p. 
80), parenthesis ours.3 
The paucity of empirical investigation of this issue may partly be due to the lack 
of data on mixed transfers and/or the inability to observe changes in the moral hazard 
behavior of recipients over a sustained period. Data on the composition of foreign aid 
and the availability of indices of recipient countries’ level of governance provide a 
unique opportunity to test this proposition. We therefore believe that our paper is the 
first to empirically investigate how the composition of transfers (i.e., the mix of in-
kind/restricted and unrestricted transfers) changes in response to changes in a 
recipient’s moral hazard behavior. 
To be sure, there are empirical studies that study how the size of transfers like 
welfare payments including in-kind transfers like food stamps affect incentives to 
save, look for work, labor supply decisions, etc and/or how the size of such payments 
is adjusted in response to the behavior of recipients (e.g., Fraker and Moffitt, 1988; 
                                                 
3 See also Radelet (2004). 
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and the surveys by Danzinger et al., 1981; Moffitt, 1992). But these studies focus on 
changes in the size of transfers as opposed to changes in the composition of transfers  
in response to changes in moral hazard behavior.4  
We use a canonical political agency model due to construct a simple signaling 
game between a possibly corrupt politician in the recipient country and an altruistic 
donor to illustrate the donor’s optimal choice of tied and untied aid. The model strikes 
a balance between the deadweight loss of tied aid and its superior ability, relative to 
untied aid, in controlling a recipient’s moral hazard behavior. We show that the donor 
reduces the proportion of tied aid as governance in the recipient country improves. 
In our empirical analysis, we find that for multilateral donors, there is an inverse 
relationship between the proportion of tied aid and the level of the recipient’s good 
governance. Also, we find that for bilateral donors, the relationship between the 
proportion of tied aid and the level of good governance is relatively weak. 
 The paper is organized as follows: the next section discusses the literature on 
foreign aid. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical model of a donor’s optimal choice 
of tied and untied aid. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and empirical analysis. We 
conclude the paper in section 6. 
 
2. Foreign aid: tied versus untied  
Foreign aid is a controversial topic that has led to past and on-going vibrant 
debates among academics and policy makers. The aversion of human beings towards 
poverty and suffering partly explains the continued flows of foreign aid from donors 
                                                 
4 Moffitt (1990) finds that US state legislatures allowed federally-financed in-kind transfers like Food 
Stamp benefits and federally-subsidized Medicaid benefits to substitute for cash transfer programs like 
AFDC. In a recent paper, Marton and Wildasin (2007) develop a model to examine how US states 
choose the mix of cash transfers (i.e., AFDC/TANF) and in-kind transfers (i.e., Medicaid) for poor 
households, and how this mix is affected by changes in the level of Federal government support for 
each program. These papers are based on complete information, so there are no moral hazard or self-
selection issues. Hence they do not address the issues in our paper.  
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to recipients. However, strategic and political reasons, independent of humanitarian 
considerations, influence foreign aid decisions. The anti-aid group believes that 
foreign aid does more harm than good and promotes a dependency syndrome.5 Partly 
in response to such criticisms, there has been a move in recent years to condition aid 
on the  quality of governance in recipient countries.  
There is a relatively big literature on the determinants of the size of foriegn aid. 
For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that past colonial ties, political alliances 
and, to some extent, good governance are major determinants of foriegn aid. 
Neumayer (2003) also finds that the degree of good governance, past colonial ties, 
population, and per capita GDP have a positive effect on the size of foriegn aid. 
Kuziemko and Weker (2006) find that being a rotating member of the UN Security 
Council has a positive effect on aid transfers from the USA and the UN. These studies 
focus on the quantity or size of aid.6  
In contrast, the study of the composition of foreign tied aid has not received much 
systematic and formal analysis.7,8 To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is 
the first to provide both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the mix of tied and 
untied foreign aid based on striking a balance between the deadweight loss of tied aid  
 
                                                 
5 For some work on the aid debate, see Burnside and Dollar (2000), Cassen and Associates (1994), 
Easterly et al (2004), Jepma (1991), Mosley (1987) and Kanbur (2006).  
6 See the references cited in Neumayer (2003). 
7Theoretical analyses of tied aid, usually by international trade economists inspired by the famous 
‘transfer paradox’, has focused on the deadweight losses, terms of trade and welfare effects of tied aid 
but not its ability to control moral hazard behavior (see, for example, Kemp and Kojima (1985), and 
Lahiri and Raimondos (1995), Schweinberger (1990)). Also, in contrast to the present paper, this 
literature does not focus on the donor’s optimal choice of tied and untied aid. It only focuses on tied 
aid. 
8 Jepma (1991) was one of the first to undertake a study of tied aid. This study was undertaken on 
behalf of the OECD. However, this study does not focus on the relationship between tied aid and 
governance that the present paper focuses on. It also does not focus on the issues of moral hazard 
behaviour and the formal analyses undertaken in this paper. 
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and its superior ability, relative to untied aid, in controlling moral hazard behavior.9  
There are three forms of tying aid. Foreign aid can be tied to (i) specific 
development projects and programs, (ii) specific commodities and services, and (iii) a 
country or group of countries where procurement has to take place. 
The first two forms of tied aid are in-kind transfers, although program aid may not 
be considered as such. The third form of tying could be seen as a restricted cash 
transfer. In what follows, we use tied aid and in-kind aid interchangeably because, as 
originally pointed out by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), restricted cash transfers and 
in-kind transfers have similar effects and are used to accomplish similar goals (see 
also Jepma, 1991). Also, these forms of tying are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, aid in the form of technical assistance from the donor country falls in groups 
(ii) and (iii), and in some cases, in group (i) as well. 
A foreign donor may benefit directly from in-kind or tied aid because such 
transfers may promote trade between the donor and the recipient (Jepma, 1991).10 
Indeed, in some cases, donors use in-kind aid in the form of technical assistance or 
require that part of the aid should be used to hire the services of consultants and firms 
from the donor country as evidenced in the above quote by UK’s Prime Minister Tony 
                                                 
9 Easterly (2006b) finds that tied aid in the form of technical assistance as a proportion of total aid from 
bilateral donors has remained constant, while the proportion of food aid has fallen over time. However, 
he does not investigate the causes of the decline in food aid. Furthermore, he suggests that this decline 
may not reflect any long-run trend but rather a reflection of the surge in food aid during the famines of 
the 1980s in Africa. 
10To elaborate on this point, note that when a country gives tied aid, it clearly requires the donor to use 
the resources given to it to purchase goods and services from the donor country. This is not trade 
because it is the donor's own resources that the recipient country is using. It is clearly a transfer from 
the donor country to the recipient. Where the trade effect might kick in is when tied aid gives, for 
example, consulting firms in the donor country exposure or connections into the recipient country’s 
economic and business community. In this way, further transactions between these firms and the 
recipient country might arise over and beyond the initial contact generated by tied aid. This latter 
transaction is not a transfer, it is trade. This implies that the causality must go from the proportion of 
tied aid to trade not the reverse. However, even if one found that tied aid had no effect on trade, it does 
not mean that a “donor-interest” motive does not exist. This is because as mentioned below, tied aid is 
also used to redistribute income to special interests in the donor country. However, as Jepma (1991, 
p.11) argues proving that tied aid causes trade is very difficult and “…tied aid represents only a small 
percentage of donor countries’ total exports.” 
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Blair’s Commission for Africa. Hence one motive for giving aid may be to promote 
trade or serve special interests by requiring that the recipient uses the aid to buy goods 
and services from the donor country. This common practice has been referred to by 
the NGO, ActionAid International as “phantom aid”.11  
As Kanbur (2006) notes tied aid may also be used as a way of redistributing 
income within the donor country, given that such aid may be raised from general 
taxation within the donor country but must be spent on purchasing the output of a 
particular industry or the services of consulting firms in the donor country. And more 
than forty years ago, Schultz (1960) noted that farm surpluses in the US and Europe 
were used as tied foreign aid with the goal of protecting the income of farmers in 
these donor countries. 
However, tied aid may also be used to control the moral hazard behavior of a 
recipient. In the context of foreign aid, moral hazard behavior may arise because the 
recipient country’s politicians may be corrupt and so have the incentive to embezzle 
foreign aid.  
Our discussions and subsequent theoretical analysis suggest that a donor whose 
sole reason for using tied foreign aid is to control moral hazard behavior - while 
minimizing the deadweight losses of such aid in the recipient country - will reduce the 
proportion of tied aid if the recipient’s past behavior gives him cause to believe that 
the incidence of moral hazard behavior is lower. Therefore, for such donors we expect 
to see an inverse relationship between the proportion of tied aid and the quality of the 
recipient’s  governance.  But for donors who use tied aid to promote trade or domestic 
redistribution of income, we expect the effect of governance on the proportion of tied 
aid to be weak (i.e., not significantly different from zero) or weaker than a donor who  
                                                 
11 See their report “Real Aid 2: Making Technical Assistance Work” available at 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/real_aid2.pdf 
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uses tied aid to control moral hazard behavior.12 Following the literature on foreign 
aid (e.g., McKinlay and Little, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984), one may refer to 
the former motive as the recipient-need motive and the latter motive as the donor-
interest motive. 
Focussing on the size of foreign aid, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) undertook a 
study using data for eighty developing countries over the period 1969-70 and 1978-
80. They found that the magnitude of bilateral donors’ aid was consistent with a 
“donor interest” model, where aid was given for political, security, and trade interests, 
while the magnitude of multilateral donor aid was consistent with a “recipient need” 
model, where aid was given in response to shortfalls in the recipient country’s 
resources. Burnside and Dollar (2000, p. 864) also found “… no significant tendency 
for total aid or bilateral aid to favour good policy. On the other hand, aid that is 
managed multilaterally … is allocated in favour of good policy.”13 Alesina and Dollar 
(2000, p. 55), also find that for bilateral donors factors such as “... colonial past and  
voting patterns in the United Nations explain more of the distribution of aid than the 
political institutions and economic policy of recipients.”14  
While the results in the preceding paragragph are consistent with our empirical 
results on the composition of aid mentioned in section 1, we argue that these results 
on the determinants of the size of foreign aid do not necessarily imply our results. In 
                                                 
12Having shown that a donor does not use tied aid to control moral hazard behavior, we do not further 
investigate whether this donor uses tied aid to promote trade or the redistribution of income motive. 
Indeed, for our purposes it suffices to show that a donor does not use tied aid to control moral hazard 
behavior and to be agnostic about his motives for using tied aid. 
13Note that this finding in their paper is not the focus of Easterly et al. (2004) critique. Easterly et al 
(2004) critique focuses on Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) finding that aid causes growth in good policy 
environment.  
14Gates and Hoeffler (2004) find, however, that Nordic countries allocate more aid based on democracy 
and human rights record in recipient countries rather than for strategic and political reasons. But again 
these studies focus on the quantity of aid. We focus on the quality of aid. Furthermore, Nordic 
countries’ total aid constitutes a small proportion of global aid flows. 
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particular, if the level of governance has an effect on the magnitude of foreign aid, 
this does not necessarily imply the direction of the effect of governance on the 
proportion of tied aid.  
Given the difference in behavior between bilateral and multilateral donors, a 
puzzling observation is why the same bilateral donor also donates to multilateral 
organizations. There appears to be duplication of efforts by bilateral and multilateral 
donors. Indeed, Kanbur et al. (1999) strongly advocate for a common pool approach 
to foriegn aid, where all bilateral donors coordinate their efforts by putting their aid in  
a common pool.15 However, the fact remains that bilateral donors have their own 
parochial, strategic, and geo-political interests. Due to the economies of scale of 
pooling resources together, there are certain goals like poverty reduction that 
multilateral agencies can achieve at much lower cost than bilateral agencies but other 
goals like a donor’s foriegn policy interests that are achieved better by a donor acting 
alone. Hence, striking a balance between achieving one’s own unique preferences 
(e.g., strategic foreign policy interests) and achieving common goals (e.g., poverty 
reduction) at lower cost can explain the co-existence of the same country’s 
participation in both bilateral and multilateral aid programs (Mavrotas and Villanger, 
2006) and the difference in behavior between these two groups of donors.  
On the preceding point, Martens et al. (2002, p. 37, 47, and 188-189) argue that a 
reason why donor countries set up multilateral agencies is to make such agencies less 
susceptible to the political demands that forces bilateral donors to pursue parochial, 
strategic and non-altruistic policies in recipient countries. 
  
 
                                                 
15Easterly (2006b) discusses the adverse effects of donor fragmentation or lack of coordination. Knack 
and Rahman (2007) formally study the implications of donor fragmentation on the quality of 
government bureaucracy in recipient countries. 
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3. A model of tied aid and untied aid 
In this section, we construct a simple model to theoretically determine a 
donor’s optimal choice of tied and untied foreign aid. We demonstrate and clarify the 
channel through which an improvement in governance might lead to a reduction in the 
proportion of tied aid. As mentioned in section 2, tied aid could take the form of an 
in-kind transfer or a restricted cash transfer.  
We use a canonical model of political agency due to Barro (1973) and 
extended by Ferejohn (1986) with the donor playing the role that voters (i.e., the 
principals) play in this class of models.16 In these models, politicians are disciplined 
via the risk of being voted out of office and thereby losing the rents of being in office. 
In our model, the leader (politician) in the recipient country is not voted out of office 
but is disciplined by the donor conditioning the size and composition of aid on the 
quality of governance. However, as we indicate in a footnote below, the donor in our 
model plays an additional role (i.e., makes expenditure decisions) that voters in this 
class of political agency models do not play.  
Suppose that leaders of the recipient country come in one of two types: good 
(honest) or bad (dishonest). These types are independent random draws from an 
identical distribution, where honest types are drawn with probability, π and dishonest 
types are drawn with probability 1 – π, where 0 < π < 1. A leader’s type is his private 
information. As in Coate and Morris (1995), Besley and Smart (2007) and Besley and 
Prat (2006), we assume that a leader rules for only two periods, where a period is  
 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Besley and Case (1995), Persson et al. (1997), Coate and Morris (1995), Besley 
and Smart (2007) and Besley and Prat (2006). See also the books by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and 
Besley (2006) for more references and exposition. 
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indexed by t = 1, 2.17 Let 0 < δ < 1 be a leader’s discount factor. 
Foreign aid is given to the leader of the recipient country for the provision of a 
public good which is assumed to fully depreciate in each period.  The leader can 
embezzle all the aid or part of it. In particular we assume that all of untied aid can be 
embezzled but tied aid cannot be embezzled or resold in the market. It is in this sense 
that tied aid controls moral hazard behaviour. This interpretation is consistent with 
how in-kind or restricted transfers are used to induce incentive-compatible outcomes 
as in, for example, Besley and Coate (1991), Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), and 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982).18  
If tied foreign aid takes the form of an in-kind transfer (e.g., technical 
assistance), then it cannot be embezzled if it is of no value to a corrupt politician and 
has no resale value. If it is a restricted cash transfer, we could assume that it cannot be 
embezzled because the donor invests resources to monitor its use and disbursement. 
For example, the donor may use stricter disbursement, procurement, and auditing 
rules.19 However, as we elaborate below, the assumption that tied aid cannot be 
embezzled is not crucial to the analysis. What matters is that the proportion of tied aid 
that can be embezzled is smaller than the proportion of untied aid that be embezzled. 
When the donor gives the recipient country Gt dollars in period t, it can be 
used to produce Gt/θ units of the public good in period t, where θ > 0 is the cost of a 
unit of the public good, Gt ∈[0, G ], and G > 0. We assume that θ is a binary random 
variable which can be high or low in each period. That is, },{ HL θθ∈θ , where  
                                                 
17 In our model, leaders rule for two periods with certainty. In Besley and Smart (2007) and Besley and 
Prat (2006), they rule for two periods if and only if they are re-elected. In both papers, the authors 
focus on the incentive effects of elections, with voters observing direct signals from politicians in the 
former case and indirectly doing so through the media in the latter case. However, as explained in the 
preceding paragraph, the leader in our model faces the same political incentives. 
18A difference is that in-kind or restricted transfers are used to prevent adverse selection in these papers 
while we use them to control moral hazard behaviour.  
19 This makes sense. Otherwise, why would the donor put in place strict rules if he does not intend to 
ensure that these rules are enforced. Jepma (1991) discusses such auditing and procurement rules. 
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θH > θL > 0. The probability that the unit cost is high is Pr(θH) = q. So Pr(θL) =1- q, 
where 0 < q < 1. We assume that the realization of θ is private information to the 
leader of the recipient country. Also, the provision of the public good cannot exceed 
Gt/θL because the donor’s aid is the only source of revenue for financing the public 
good, t = 1, 2. The donor knows the distribution of costs and leaders’ types but does 
not directly observe any of these variables. 
Let xt – C(Gt) be the donor’s objective function in period t, where xt is the  per 
capita provision (consumption) of the public good in the recipient country by the 
leader, and C(Gt) is the cost of Gt dollars to the donor.20 We assume that foreign aid is 
financed through distortionary taxation in the donor country, so C(Gt) > Gt.21 We also 
assume that C(Gt) is increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable. Also, C(0) = 
0, ∞=′→ )G(Clim tGtG and 0)G(Clim t0tG =′→ .  
The donor’s choice of the size and composition of aid in period t depends on 
the level of governance in the recipient country in period t-1. To the donor, the quality 
of governance in the recipient country in period t is an increasing function of the level 
of public good provision and is given by gt = gt(xt), t = 1,2. Without any loss of 
generality, we assume that gt(xt) = xt. This function is common knowledge. 
This simple interaction is a dynamic game of incomplete information between 
the donor and the leader (i.e., agent) of the recipient country. We look for perfect 
Bayesian equilibria of this game.  
 
 
                                                 
20We could also define xt to be the per capita provision (consumption) of some private good such as 
health or education. Implicit in the donor’s objective function is the assumption that he is altruistic 
since he cares about the consumption of individuals in the recipient country. 
21 See Besley and Smart (2007) for a similar assumption but in a different context. Alternatively, the 
extra cost could be the transactions costs of transferring G dollars to the recipient (Besley and Prat, 
2006). 
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3.1 Equilibrium analysis for untied aid 
We first focus on untied aid. Let ρt ≡ ( )1tt gh −ρ  be the donor’s posterior belief 
in period t that the leader is honest given that he observed a level of governance gt-1 in 
the previous period. Necessarily ρ1 = π. Define H1g ≡ G1/θH and 
L
1g ≡ G1/θL. Since the 
game ends in period 2, the quality of governance in period 2 has no effect on the 
donor’s behaviour, so we only focus on g1 = x1. 
Consider the following candidate perfect Bayesian equilibrium: in period t, an 
honest leader produces Gt/θL units of the public good if θ = θL and Gt/θH units if  
θ = θH, t =1, 2. If θ = θL, then in period 1, a dishonest leader chooses g1 = G1/θH, 
spends X1 dollars on the public good, and embezzles (G1 – X1) dollars of aid, where  
X1/θL = G1/θH. If θ = θH, a dishonest leader sets g1 = 0 (i.e., embezzles all aid) in 
period 1.  A dishonest leader embezzles all aid in period 2, regardless of θ. The 
donor’s equilibrium belief in period 1 is ρ1 = π. His beliefs in period 2, using Bayes’ 
rule, are as follows:  ( )0gh 12 =ρ  = 0, ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ρ H12 gh  = qπ/(qπ + (1- π)(1-q)),  and 
⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ρ
L
12 gh  = 1. If the donor uses untied tied in a given period, the optimal size is a 
function of his beliefs in that period and is given by Gt(ρt), t = 1,2. If a dishonest 
leader embezzles all untied aid in period 1, the donor uses tied aid in period 2. 
Note that if the donor observes any level of the public good in period 1 such 
that G1/θH < g1 < G1/θL, then he knows that the leader got a cost draw of θL since  
g1 > G1/θH is not possible if θ = θH. But since g1 < G1/θL, he can correctly infer that 
the leader has embezzled some funds and is therefore corrupt. Also, if g1 < G1/θH, the 
donor can correctly infer that the leader is dishonest (i.e., embezzled some funds) and 
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will therefore embezzle all aid in period 2. Therefore, a reasonable out-of-equilibrium 
belief for the donor is ( )12 ghρ  = 0 if }g,g{g L1H11∉ . In this case, the donor uses tied  
aid in period 2, since we have assumed that the leader cannot embezzle tied aid. 22  
One might argue that for G1/θH < g1 < G1/θL, it may be optimal for the donor to 
use untied aid in period 2 even if he knew that that leader was corrupt. In this case, the 
leader will exercise more restraint by setting g1 such that G1/θH < g1 < G1/θL instead of 
g1 = G1/θH, if θ = θL. The problem with this strategy is that it is not credible because 
the donor cannot commit to not using tied aid in period 2 given his posterior belief of 
( )12 ghρ  = 0.  
In our candidate equilibrium, a dishonest leader mimicks (i.e., pools with) an 
honest leader when θ = θL but separates when θ = θH. We now show that our 
candidate equilibrium is indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
We first determine the donor’s optimal choice of untied aid. Note that a 
necessary condition for the donor to use untied aid in a given period is  
ρt > 0, t = 1, 2. Hence in finding the optimal untied aid, we restrict our analysis to  
ρt > 0, t = 1, 2. Note that ρ1 = π > 0. But ρ2 > 0 if and only if the donor observed G1/θL 
or G1/θH in period 1.  
 
 
                                                 
22 This assumption is not crucial to our analysis. What matters is that the proportion of tied aid that can 
be embezzled is smaller than the proportion of untied aid that be embezzled. Given our assumptions on 
the properties of C(G), the donor will still use tied aid even if some proportion of tied aid can be 
embezzled or is fungible, so long as the proportion that is fungible is smaller than 1. To see this, 
suppose the donor gives x(G) units of tied aid in period 2, and a dishonest leader embezzles (1-λ)x(G) 
units of it, where 0 < λ ≤ 1, x(0) = 0, and x is increasing in G. The donor will choose G to maximize 
λx(G) – C(G). Then given 0)tG(C0tGlim =′→ , it is easy to show the donor will choose G > 0. To 
reiterate, the crucial assumption for our analysis is that the leader can embezzle a higher proportion of 
untied aid than tied aid. However, for simplicity, we assume that all untied aid can be embezzled but no 
proportion of tied aid be embezzled. 
 15
Given the strategies of dishonest and honest types in our candidate 
equilibrium, the donor chooses untied aid G1 in period 1, given his posterior belief  
ρ1 = π, to maximize23 
( ) ( ) )1G(C)H/1G)(q1(11)H/1G(q)L/1G)(q1(1)1(UW −θ−ρ−+θ+θ−ρ=ρ   (1) 
 Noting that a dishonest leader embezzles all untied aid in period 2, it follows 
that if the donor observed G1/θL or G1/θH in period 1, he chooses untied aid G2 in 
period 2 to maximize 
( ) )G(C)/G(q)/G)(q1()(W 2H2L222U −θ+θ−ρ=ρ    (2) 
where ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh  = qπ/(qπ + (1- π)(1-q)) and ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ρ
L
12 gh  = 1.  
Setting 0G/W tU =∂∂  and solving for Gt, we abuse notation by writing the 
optimal untied aid in periods 1 and 2 (respectively) as  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θ
−+θρ+θ
ρ−−′=ρ −
LH
1
H
11
1
*
U
q1q)1)(q1(C)(G     (3) 
and 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θ
−+θρ′=ρ
−
LH
2
1
2
*
U
q1qC)(G       (4) 
where 1C −′ is the inverse function of C′ (Gt).  
Let )(W 1
*
U ρ and )(W 2*U ρ be the maximized values of (1) and (2) respectively. 
By the envelope theorem, 0/)(W tt
*
U >ρ∂ρ∂ , t = 1, 2. Since C(Gt) is strictly convex, 
it follows that 0/)(G tt
*
U >ρ∂ρ∂ , t = 1, 2. 
                                                 
23 Notice that in Besley and Smart (2007) and Besley and Prat (2006), the politician chooses the size of 
total resources for public expenditure and how much of this to embezzle. In our model, the size of total 
resources  is determined by the donor (i.e., the principal) not the politician (i.e., the agent). The 
politician only chooses how much to embezzle. Therefore, the principal in our model plays an 
additional role that voters do not typically play in this political agency model. 
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For now suppose that q ≤ 0.5.24 Then  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh  = qπ/(qπ + (1- π)(1-q)) ≤ π = ρ1. So ρ1 ≥ ρ2 if g1 = G1/θH. Then  
given (1-q)(1- ρ1) > 0, it follows from (3) and (4), that )(G 1
*
U ρ > )(G 2*U ρ if the donor 
observed  g1 = G1/θH in period 1.  
Now consider a leader in the recipient country. Given that honest leaders are 
non-strategic, we focus on dishonest leaders. Since period 2 is the last period of this 
game, it is optimal for a dishonest leader to embezzle all aid in period 2.  
Consider period 1. In our candidate equilibrium, a dishonest leader exercises 
restraint in period 1 by spending X1 dollars on the public good and providing  
X1/θL = G1/θH units of the public good, if θ = θL. This restraint by the leader is the 
discipline effect of the donor conditioning further untied aid on good governance.25 
For this to be an equilibrium strategy, we require that 
( )11122 X)(G)(G −ρ+ρδ  ≥ G1(ρ1).        (5) 
Noting that we can write X1 = θLG1(ρ1)/θH  allows us to rewrite (5) as 
)(G)(G 11
H
L
22 ρθ
θ≥ρδ         (5a) 
It is important to note that if θ = θL, a dishonest leader will not deviate from 
the strategy in our candidate equilibrium in period 1 given that (5a) holds and the 
donor’s out-of-equilibrium belief is ( )12 ghρ  = 0 if }g,g{g L1H11∉ ,  
Now consider θ = θH. Given the donor’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs, there is no 
point in embezzling less than G1 dollars of aid in period 1 if θ = θH. Suppose instead 
that a dishonest leader deviates from our candidate equilibrium strategy by pooling 
with an honest type in period 1 and providing G1/θH units of the public good. That is, 
                                                 
24 We shall relax this assumption later. 
25 This discipline effect is common in this class of political agency models. 
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he will not embezzle any aid in period 1, if θ = θH. But given that (5a) holds, it 
follows that a dishonest leader provides G1/θH units of the public good in period 1 
regardless of θ. Then the donor’s belief in period 2, using Bayes’ rule, is  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh  = qπ/(qπ + (1- π)) < π = ρ1. Then ρ1 > ρ2  implies )(G 1*U ρ > )(G 2*U ρ . 
Given θ = θH, a dishonest leader’s discounted payoff, if he does not embezzle any aid 
in period 1, is )(G 2
*
U ρδ . But )(G 1*U ρ > )(G 2*U ρ implies )(G 1*U ρ > )(G 2*U ρδ . Hence if 
θ = θH, a dishonest leader is better off if he embezzles all aid in period 1.26  
It follows that a dishonest leader will not deviate from our candidate 
equilibrium in periods 1 and 2. Also, the donor’s choices of untied aid, )(G 1
*
U ρ  and 
)(G 2
*
U ρ , in each period are optimal, given his beliefs. Therefore, our candidate 
equilibrium is indeed a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
Now suppose q > 0.5, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh  = qπ/(qπ + (1- π)(1-q)) > π ≡ ρ1, and  
)(G 1
*
U ρ < )(G 2*U ρ , given that the equilibrium in the first period was pooling. We can 
still construct the equilibrium above, so long as we assume that (5a) holds and 
)(G 1
*
U ρ > )(G 2*U ρδ . 
Since ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ρ
L
12 gh  > ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh > ( )0gh 12 =ρ , it follows that ( )12 ghρ  is 
increasing in g1 in equilibrium. 
 
3.2 Additional assumptions and equilibrium analysis for tied aid 
We now formally examine tied aid. When the donor uses tied aid, we assume 
that the public good is produced at a unit cost of θD ≠ },{ HL θθ∈θ . For example, the 
                                                 
26 This means that there exists no equilibrium in which a dishonest leader provides G1/θH units of the 
public good in period 1 regardless of the value of θ. 
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donor may require that the recipient must use the services of firms, consultants, etc in 
the donor’s country. 
We assume that θD is a random variable continuously distributed on [θ , θ ] 
with density f(θD) > 0, a strictly increasing distribution function F(θD) and θ > 0. We 
assume that θ  > θH. Then, θD > θH > θL. Therefore tied aid increases the unit cost of 
production relative to untied aid (Jepma, 1991; Commission for Africa, 2005). Herein 
lies the deadweight loss of tied aid stemming from incomplete information. Since the 
donor does not know whether the leader is honest or dishonest, there is a deadweight 
loss of tied aid if a potentially honest leader could have produced the public good at a 
lower unit cost of θ < θD, where },{ HL θθ∈θ . A deadweight loss could also occur if 
the leader is corrupt but wants to pool in the first period (i.e., a corrupt leader got a 
draw of θL) and θD is sufficiently high.27  
However, tied aid has the advantage of reducing moral hazard behaviour since 
it is more difficult for the leader to embezzle funds when aid is tied. Hence following 
the literature on unrestricted versus in-kind (restricted) transfers, we incorporate these 
two features of tied aid into our analysis.  
As noted earlier, if tied aid takes the form of a restricted cash transfer, the 
donor invests resources in monitoring its use in order to eliminate or reduce 
embezzlement. In this case, we could write the cost of monitoring G dollars of such 
restricted cash transfer as βC(G), where β ≥ 0 and such monitoring eliminates  
embezzlement. So the total cost of G dollars of tied aid to the donor is (1+ β)C(G). 
This will not affect our analysis, so we set β = 0. 
                                                 
27Alternatively, we could have captured this deadweight loss by assuming that there is a parameter in 
the utility function of a representative citizen of the recipient country which is private information to 
the leader. The current formulation makes the signalling problem much easier to model and is 
consistent with the channel through which the deadweight loss of tied aid is identified in the literature 
(e.g., Jepma, 1991). 
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Since we assume that tied aid cannot be embezzled, the donor chooses the 
same size of tied aid G in each period to maximize  
)G(CGW
D
T −θ=           (6) 
The solution to this problem gives )(G D
*
T θ  and ))(G,(W D*TD*T θθ . It is easy to show 
that 0/G D
*
T <θ∂∂ . Also, the envelope theorem gives D*T /W θ∂∂  < 0. 
 
3.3 Optimal choice of tied and untied aid  
In the first period, when the donor uses untied aid his expected payoff is 
)(W 1
*
U ρ . Hence, the donor is indifferent between tied aid and untied aid in the first 
period if ))(G,(W D
*
TD
*
T θθ = )(W 1*U ρ . We abuse notation by rewriting this equation 
as )(W D
*
T θ = )(W 1*U ρ . This equation gives the critical unit cost 
))(W(S)(ˆ 1
*
U
1
1D ρ=ρθ − , where S-1  is the inverse function of *TW . This inverse 
function exists because *TW  is monotonic in θD. Since 
*
TW  is decreasing in θD, it 
follows the donor will use tied aid in period 1 if θD ≤ )(ˆ 1D ρθ and will untied aid if θD 
> )(ˆ 1D ρθ . Then probability that the donor will use tied aid in period 1 is  
Pr1(tied aid) ))(ˆ(Fd)(f 1D
)1(Dˆ
*
1 ρθ=θθ=σ≡ ∫
ρθ
θ
      (7) 
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that )(W)(W 1
*
U
*
T ρ>θ  and 
)(W)(W 1
*
U
*
T ρ<θ . Then θ  < )(ˆ 1D ρθ < θ . 
Now consider the second period. If the donor observed g1 = 0 in the first 
period, then he uses tied aid with certainty in the second period. Hence, the donor 
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increases the proportion of tied aid to the maximum level in the second period, given 
that governance was at its minimum level in the first period.  
If the donor observed H1g ≡ G1/θH or 
L
1g ≡ G1/θL in period 1, then the donor 
knows that in the second period his expected payoff, if he uses untied aid, is 
)(W 2
*
U ρ , where ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ L12 gh  > ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ρ H12 gh . So if )(W D*T θ = )(W 2*U ρ , the donor will be 
indifferent between tied and untied aid in the second period. Then we may write the 
critical unit cost as ))(W(S)(ˆ 2
*
U
1
2D ρ=ρθ − , where S-1  is the inverse function of *TW . 
Since *TW  is decreasing in θD, it follows that 0W/ˆ
*
UD <∂θ∂ .  
As before, the donor will use tied aid in period 2 if θD ≤ )(ˆ 2D ρθ and will use 
untied aid if θD > )(ˆ 2D ρθ . The probability of tied aid in period 2 is 
Pr2(tied aid) ))(ˆ(Fd)(f 2D
)2(Dˆ
*
2 ρθ=θθ=σ≡ ∫
ρθ
θ
      (8) 
Again, we assume that θ  < )(ˆ 2D ρθ < θ . 
 Given equation (8), we obtain 
0
g
W
W
ˆ
ˆ
F
g 1
2
2
*
U
*
U
D
D1
*
2 <∂
ρ∂
ρ∂
∂
∂
θ∂
θ∂
∂=∂
σ∂        (9) 
The first derivative on the right hand side of (9) is positive since F(θD) is 
increasing in θD. The second derivative is negative as shown above. We have also 
shown that the last two derivatives are each positive. Thus in equilibrium, the 
probability that the donor will use tied aid is smaller, as the level of governance 
improves. This comparative static result in (9) establishes the result that the proportion 
of tied aid falls as the level of governance improves.  
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The intuition for this comparative static result stems from the fact an 
improvement in governance increases the donor’s posterior that the leader is honest 
and increases the probability (i.e., ρ2) that the cost savings due to a draw of  
},{ HL θθ∈θ  will be realized. This increases the expected payoff from using untied 
aid; that is, 0g/)(W 12
*
U >∂ρ∂ . Hence, an improvement in governance leads to an 
increase in the expected deadweight loss of tied aid and a reduction in expected moral 
hazard behaviour. This causes the donor to reduce the range of cost types for which he 
will choose to use tied aid (i.e., 0g/)(ˆ 12D <∂ρθ∂ ). 
We summarize our analysis in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: For a donor who uses tied foreign aid to control a recipient’s moral 
hazard behaviour while taking cognizance of the possible deadweight loss of such aid, 
an improvement in the recipient’s level of governance reduces the proportion of aid 
that is tied. 28 
 It is important to note that we cannot necessarily conclude that 
0/)(G 22
*
U >ρ∂ρ∂ implies that 0/ 2*2 <ρ∂σ∂ . We need to consider other factors 
before concluding that if an improvement in the level of governance leads to an 
increase in the size of aid, 29 then this will also reduce the proportion of tied aid. What 
also needs to be considered is the effect of an improvement in governance on the 
deadweight loss of tied aid since this increases the expected payoff from using untied 
aid. This latter effect is captured by 0g/)(W 12
*
U >∂ρ∂  resulting in 0W/ˆ *UD <∂θ∂ . 
                                                 
28 There is also an equilibrium in which a dishonest leader embezzles all aid in period 1 regardless of 
the value of θ. Of course, this occurs if δ is sufficiently small. While we do not focus on this 
equilibrium, it is also consistent with our proposition 1 because the donor uses tied aid with certainty in 
the second period. Hence, the donor increases the proportion of tied aid to the maximum level in the 
second period, given that governance was at its minimum level in the first period.  
29 In our model, the level of governance does not directly affect the size of tied aid. It only affects the 
probability that the donor will use tied aid. Therefore, to capture how the level of governance affects 
the size of total aid, we focus on how governance affects the size of untied aid, *UG . 
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 It is also important to note that one cannot conclude that 0/)(G 22
*
U =ρ∂ρ∂  
implies that 0/ 2
*
2 =ρ∂σ∂ . One could argue that it is possible to have 
0/)(G 22
*
U =ρ∂ρ∂ but 0/ 2*2 <ρ∂σ∂ . To see this, suppose the cost of untied aid to the 
donor is a linear function, such that the optimal size of untied aid is a corner solution, 
G > 0. The donor’s welfare will be still be increasing in ρ2, although G is independent 
of ρ2. Then if we assume that the cost of tied aid is still C(G), it is easy to show that 
the proportion of tied aid falls as governance improves. However, the conditions 
required to obtain this result do not accord with casual empiricism or are too stringent.  
First, the corner solution means that we have a knife-edge result for the optimal 
untied aid which requires severe restrictions on the parameters of the model. Second, 
if as argued in section 2, tied aid is used as a redistributive tool to serve special 
interests like firms in the donor country and if good governance leads to better 
economic outcomes and opportunities in the recipient country, then one may argue 
that more aid will be tied as governance improves. To be precise, suppose a recipient 
is given a total aid of size G, where some proportion must be spent on goods from the 
donor country. Now suppose that there is an improvement in governance in the 
recipient country leading to better economic opportunities. To enable firms in the 
donor country to take advantage of the better economic opportunities, the donor may 
increase the proportion of tied aid, holding G fixed.  But it is not clear why the size of 
aid will also not be increased to take advantage of the better economic opportunities 
in the recipient country.  
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Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to think of a plausible story or model 
where the size of aid is not responsive to the level of governance but the proportion of 
tied aid is.30 
One may conjecture that if the level of governance is very bad, the donor might 
give a very small total aid but since the aid is very small, he will not find it necessary 
to tie it. Our model makes this prediction under the following conditions. Recall that 
if the deadweight loss of tied aid is very high (i.e., θD > )(ˆ 2D ρθ ), then the donor will 
not use tied aid. If ρ2 is very low, then the optimal untied aid, )(G 2
*
U ρ , in period 2 
will be very low. Hence if the deadweight loss of tied aid is sufficiently high and the 
donor’s posterior belief of the quality of politicians is very low, then the total aid will 
be very small but will be untied. On the other hand, if the deadweight loss of tied aid 
is very low, then the donor will use tied aid. So while the size of aid could 
conceivably affect the decision to use full untied aid or full tied aid, the direction of 
this effect may be ambiguous. 
The preceding does not imply a continuous relationship between the size of aid 
and the proportion of tied aid. It suggests that there is a discontinuous relationship 
between size of aid and proportion of tied aid where there is a threshold size of total 
aid below which aid is not tied. 
Note that the donor would never use untied aid if we had assumed that θL > θD. 
However, it is important to note that our analysis would still have gone through if we 
had assumed that θL < θD < θH. What we require for the donor to use untied aid with 
some positive probability is that there is a positive probability of a deadweight loss 
associated with tied aid. Given θL < θD < θH, there is a deadweight loss when the cost 
                                                 
30 In any case, for a donor who may be influenced by the level of governance in the recipient country, 
but does not use tied aid to control moral hazard behaviour, the proportion of tied aid is likely to either 
increase or remain constant as governance improves.  
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draw is θL and the politician is honest or the politician is corrupt but wants to restrain 
himself, and θD is sufficiently large relative to θL.  
Our model is very simple. However, we believe that it captures the salient features 
of our point on the need to strike a balance between the deadweight loss of tied aid 
and its superior ability, relative to untied aid, in controlling moral hazard behaviour.  
In the literature on the efficiency properties of cash and in-kind transfers, the 
comparison is usually made as a choice between either a cash transfer or an in-kind 
transfer. But, as noted earlier, Gahvari and de Mattos (2007) show that combining a 
conditional cash transfer with an in-kind transfer can reduce or eliminate the 
deadweight losses of in-kind transfers.  They model this combination of cash and in-
kind transfers in a deterministic way. One could see our framework as one in which 
the donor uses a probabilistic combination of tied and untied transfers depending on  
his draw of θD.31 However, whether the combination between tied and untied transfers 
is deterministic or probabilistic, the economics of using both remains the same. So as 
in Gahvari and de Mattos (2007), cash transfers are used in our model because of the 
                                                 
31 A deterministic combination of tied and untied aid can be modelled as follows. Suppose a proportion 
µt of the donor’s aid is untied in period t, t =1, 2. So in period t, the donor chooses a total aid of Gt 
dollars where µtGt is tied and (1-µt)Gt is untied, t = 1, 2. Continue to assume that all untied aid can be 
embezzled but tied aid cannot be embezzled. Assume that θD is also known by the leader. And suppose 
the total cost of µtGt dollars of tied aid and (1-µt)Gt dollars of untied aid is C(Gt), where C(Gt) is the 
cost function in the text. Then as before, we can construct an equilibrium where a corrupt leader 
embezzles all untied aid in period 2; embezzles all untied aid in period 1 if θ = θH; and the level of 
public good provision in period 1 by a corrupt leader is µ1G1/θD + (1- µ1)G2/θH, if θ = θL. For an honest 
leader, the level of public good provision in period t is µtGt/θD + (1- µt)Gt/θH, if θ = θH and it is  
µtGt/θD + (1- µt)Gt/θL, if θ = θL, t = 1, 2. It is easy to show that the donor’s payoff in period t can be 
written as a weighted sum of the payoffs in the text. That is, the donor’s payoff in period t is  
V(ρt) = µtWT + (1- µt)WU(ρt), t = 1,2. Then given Gt, *tµ = 1 if WT ≥ WU(ρt) and *tµ = 0 if WT < WU(ρt), 
t = 1,2. Therefore, the donor chooses only untied aid to maximize WU(ρt), and chooses only tied aid to 
maximize WT and then compares the payoffs. This is exactly what we have in the text. Now suppose 
CT(G) be the cost of G dollars of tied aid and let CU(G) be the corresponding cost for untied aid. Then 
if CT(G) and CU(G) are both increasing and strictly convex, we could have 0 < *tµ < 1. In period t, the 
cost of untied aid will be CU((1-µt)Gt) and the cost of tied aid will be CT(µtGt). We can then show that 
∂ *tµ /∂ρt < 0. Differences in the cost of tied and untied aid to the donor may stem from differences in 
transportation and transactions costs of transferring a dollar of in-kind aid to the recipient relative to the 
cost of transferring a dollar in cash. But in order not to appeal to differences in costs to the donor, we 
used the formulation in the text. Moreover, it is easier to analyze. 
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possible deadweight loss of in-kind transfers and in-kind transfers are used to control 
moral hazard behaviour or relax self-selection constraints.  
Finally, we note that since in our model, the donor has no information on the past 
level of governance in period 1 and therefore bases his choice of tied or untied aid on 
an exogenous prior, π, we do not think that there is any economic insight gained from 
comparing the relative magnitudes of *1σ  and *2σ  as far as determining how past 
governance affects the proportion of tied aid is concerned. 
 
4. Data Set and Summary Statistics 
In order to empirically test the predictions of our theoretical model we need 
proxies for both an indicator of the extent of tied multilateral/bilateral aid in total aid 
receipts and a measure of governance.   
The aid data is from the OECD-Credit Reporting System (CRS) database. For 
bilateral donors the information shows that aid to a recipient is reported in three 
categories: (i) untied and/or (ii) fully tied and/or (iii) partially tied. For multilateral 
agencies the information shows that aid is untied and/or partially tied. There was no 
fully tied category for multilateral aid. 
Untied aid means that no proportion of it is tied to the goods and services of any 
country. Fully tied aid means that 100% of it is tied to the procurement of goods and 
services from the donor country. Partially tied aid requires that aid must be used to 
procure goods and services in the donor country or among a restricted group of other 
countries chosen by the donor which must include developing countries. The OECD 
notes that this kind of aid is subject to the same disciplines as tied aid. However, as 
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the UNDP (2005, p. 102) notes “[T]he full extent of tied aid is unknown because of 
unclear or incomplete reporting by donors.”32  
As proxies for governance we use two indices compiled by the Freedom House 
since 1972, namely the political rights index (PR) and the civil liberties index (CL). 
These indices are very popular and commonly used in the foreign aid literature (e.g., 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  The political rights index is meant to capture the extent to 
which citizens can participate in the political process by competing for public office 
and exercising their right to vote.  In contrast, the civil rights index measures whether 
citizens have enough freedom to develop opinions and personal autonomy without 
state interference.  The scores range from 1 to 7 for both indices, where a lower score 
indicates better governance.  
For the sake of convenience, we reverse the order so that higher values correspond 
to better governance.  One should note that there are of course other indicators of 
good governance that have been used in the literature.  One popular proxy has been 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indices. More recently, the World Bank 
has also constructed the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index of 
governance. While the CPIA clearly has some advantages with regard to accurately 
capturing good governance, unfortunately they are only available for a number of 
recent years and would make any panel estimation infeasible in our context. More 
importantly, in the years that they are all available, these indices tend to be 
significantly correlated with the Freedom House indices (Dollar and Levin, 2004). 
We also include population and GDP per capita as additional explanatory 
variables. Our data on GDP per capita and population are taken from the Penn Tables.  
All in all, non-missing observations on all our variables left us with a total sample of 
                                                 
32 For example, the USA has not reported tying data since 1996. In addition to incomplete reporting, 
indirect, de facto, or informal tying could understate the true extent of tied aid (see Jepma, 1991). 
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119 recipient countries for bilateral donors and 115 recipients for multilateral donors 
over the 1993-2003 period.33 One should note in this regard that not all years were 
available for all recipients, in part due to missing values and in part due to the nature 
of our dependent variable, where in years of no aid, the proportion tied was obviously 
undefined.   Thus our sample is of an unbalanced panel nature.   
We have graphed total multilateral aid, partially tied multilateral aid, and the 
proportion of partially tied multilateral in figures 1 and 2.  We also did the same for 
bilateral aid in figures 3 and 4. With regard to multilateral aid, it is apparent that total 
aid has increased substantially over the period hitting a maximum of over 20 billion in 
2003.  At the same time the share that is tied has also increased substantially. More 
precisely, while in the early 1990s only a small proportion of multilateral aid was tied, 
by 2003 over a quarter of aid was tied. The mean proportion of partially tied 
multilateral aid during this period, as shown in Table 1, was about 32%. However, as 
noted earlier, one cannot be fully sure of the extent of tied aid. 
While total bilateral aid has shown an up-and-down movement over our sample 
period, the share of aid that is tied, in contrast to multilateral aid, seems to have fallen 
over the period. Figure 4 shows that the proportion of bilateral fully tied aid was 
substantially higher than the proportion of bilateral partially tied at the beginning of 
our sample period (i.e., 1993-2003) but the gap had narrowed at the end of the period. 
The mean difference between these variables is about 0.14 as shown in Table 1. 
In figure 5, we graphed the average values of our two indices of governance of our 
sample. These indices have followed similar trends during our sample period.  It is 
clear that governance has on average improved, rising steadily during the 1993-2003 
period.  
                                                 
33 The list of bilateral and multilateral donors is given in appendix A. 
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5. Econometric Analysis 
One way of testing a donor’s motive for using tied aid is to code the dependent 
variable as 1 if a donor used either fully tied or partially tied aid or both and 0 if and 
only if he used only untied aid, and then use probit model to estimate the probability 
that tied aid will be used. However, a probit model or any qualitative response 
regression model requires that the choice of one alternative precludes the choice of all 
other alternatives. This situation does not apply to our case because a donor can 
simultaneously choose a combination of tied and untied aid.  More importantly, both 
groups of donors in our sample chose some mix of tied and untied aid for almost all 
years and for almost all recipients. Indeed, for multilateral aid, there were no extreme 
values (i.e., 1 or 0) for our dependent variable.  We elaborate more in the next 
footnote. 
In view of the preceding point, we test the predictions of our model by instead 
estimating the following regression equation: 
it1it1itit Xg)aid_tiedlog( ε+γ+φ+α= −−     (10) 
where tied_aid refers to the proportion of aid that is tied for recipient i in time t from 
either all bilateral or multilateral sources, g is our proxy for governance (either PR or 
CL), X is a vector of other explanatory variables, and ε is an error term.34 The log-
linear specification in (10) is very common in the foreign aid literature where the 
                                                 
34 Since the proportion of tied aid is bounded between 0 and 1, it might be necessary to, for example, 
apply a logistic transformation to this proportion in order to avoid problems of a bounded dependent 
variable. However, there were very few observations in our data in which the dependent variable was 
either 0 or 1. As noted earlier, there were no zero values or 1 in the multilateral case. And in more than 
a 1000 observations in the bilateral case, there were only 27 zero values (i.e., less than 2.7%) and two 
values of 1 when the dependent variable is the proportion of fully tied bilateral aid.  When the 
dependent variable is the proportion of all tied bilateral aid (i.e., includes partially tied aid), there were 
only two values of 1 and 11 zero values. Nevertheless, to ensure that the few zero observations of the 
proportion of tied bilateral aid do not drop out of the analysis when we take logarithms we added 
0.0001 to the zero values. As noted by Dollar and Levin (2006, p. 2037), adding a small positive 
number to zero values is a common transformation (see, for example, note 14 in Alesina and Dollar, 
2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006, p. 2037; Kuziemko and Werker, pp. 919 and 927). 
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dependent variable is the log of the size of aid (e.g., see Alesina and Dollar, 2004; 
Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). 
Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we assume that the level of 
governance at time t-1 may affect the proportion of tied aid at time t. We thus 
similarly also allow the effect of other explanatory variables to have a lagged effect 
on the dependent variable.  
An important prerequisite for unbiased estimates of the coefficients in any 
panel empirical equation, such as equation (10), is that the (unexplained) error term is 
uncorrelated with the chosen explanatory variables.  In other words, any unobservable 
factors determining proportion of tied aid which may be correlated with the regressors 
must be properly controlled for to avoid endogeneity bias.  In order to control for this 
possibility in terms of time invariant unobservables we use a simple fixed effects 
estimator.35  
We estimate equation (10) for bilateral and multilateral donors.  The 
distinction between these groups of donors reflects results in the literature on foreign 
aid, discussed in section 2, which suggest that that these two groups of donors face 
different incentives and therefore behave differently. Moreover, we only had access to 
this kind of aggregate data from the OECD database. We return to this dichotomy 
between multilateral and bilateral donors in our concluding remarks. 
Both partially tied and fully tied fall in the class of restricted transfers which 
are presumably used to control moral hazard behaviour. Of course, this is what we 
wish to test. So to the extent that partially tied aid has some restriction, albeit, less 
restriction than fully tied aid, we treat partially tied aid as fully tied. In the case of 
bilateral aid, where both categories of aid are available, we define total bilateral tied 
                                                 
35 Since we follow our model in that good governance at time t-1 determines the proportion of tied aid 
at time t we can abstract from any simultaneity bias after we have purged unobserved fixed effects. 
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aid as the sum of partially tied aid and fully tied aid, where the dependent variable is 
the log of the proportion of total bilateral tied aid. However, we also ran our 
regressions using the log of the proportion of fully tied bilateral aid as the dependent 
variable. In case of multilateral aid which has no fully tied aid category, we use the 
log of the proportion of partially tied multilateral aid as the dependent variable. 
Our empirical results for multilateral aid are presented in Table 2. The first 
two columns contain the estimates for our two proxies without including any 
additional explanatory variables.  As can be seen, in accordance with our model both 
proxies, CL and PR, have a negative and significant effect on the proportion of tied 
multilateral aid.  In other words, when countries display better governance a smaller 
proportion of their multilateral aid is tied.  As is apparent from the final two columns, 
this finding is robust to including additional explanatory variables, where we added 
the lagged values GDP per capita and total population, to control for wealth and 
country size effects, respectively. 
In contrast, our governance measures have no discernable effect on the 
proportion of tied aid from bilateral donors as is shown in Table 3. More precisely, 
the coefficient on CL and PR are insignificant and are implausibly positive which 
suggests that, for bilateral donors, tied aid is not used to control moral hazard 
behavior. This result, as can be seen from the final two columns, is robust to the 
inclusion of our additional explanatory variables.  
We re-ran our bilateral specification with the log of the proportion of only 
fully tied aid as the dependent variable, the results of which are shown in Table 4. In 
this case, the sign on our CL governance proxy is positive and insignificant, with and 
without the inclusion of GDP per capita and population size. For our PR governance 
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measure, the sign is negative but insignificant, with and without our additional 
explanatory variables. 
 
6. Conclusion 
There is huge literature on foreign aid. Most of this literature has focussed on 
the quantity of aid. Not much formal analyses and empirical attention have been 
devoted to tied foreign aid.  
While the information-based approach to public economics has extensively 
and formally examined the use of in-kind transfers as incentive-compatible schemes 
of transfers within national borders, it has surprisingly not paid a similar attention to 
the use of such transfers between sovereign nations. Drawing on insights in this 
literature, we investigated the role of tied aid as a mechanism for controlling moral 
hazard behaviour in foreign aid transfers.  
Our findings suggest that multilateral agencies use tied aid to control the 
perverse behaviour of recipients, and do reward good behaviour by reducing the 
proportion of tied aid. We find that these findings are weaker for bilateral donors or 
do not apply to them. Bilateral donors do not seem to use tied aid to control moral 
hazard behaviour. They may well use it to promote the redistribution of income to 
special interests in their countries.   
On a more general note, we believe that our paper is the first to empirically 
investigate how the composition of transfers (i.e., the mix of in-kind and cash 
transfers or the mix of restricted and unrestricted cash transfers) changes in response 
to changes in a recipient’s moral hazard behavior. 
To the extent that conditioning the composition of aid on governance may induce 
recipient countries to deliver better socio-economic outcomes, one may be tempted to 
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argue that our paper contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of aid (e.g., 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Easterly, 2001, 2006b; Easterly et al, 2004; Sachs, 
2005). If good governance influences aid decisions, then aid is more likely to be 
effective to the extent that the prospect of future aid will induce aid recipients to strive 
for better political and economic performance. However, we do not wish to claim too 
much for our results in this regard. Foreign aid, even if tied, may create a different 
kind of moral hazard behavior through the over dependence of the recipient on the 
donor’s charity (see, for example, Coate, 1995; and Pedersen, 2001). This moral 
hazard behavior (i.e., dependency syndrome) stemming from aid may exist even if the 
politicians in the recipient country are honest.36 
In conclusion, we wish to point out that our theoretical framework does not 
predict whether a particular donor will change the composition of foreign aid in 
response to moral hazard behaviour. Hence the difference in the behaviour of bilateral 
and multilateral donors, while interesting, need not be our main contribution. Our 
theoretical analysis offers a framework and methodology for testing this proposition. 
Our main contribution is therefore a theoretical and empirical methodology that 
allows us to test whether a foreign donor uses in-kind or restricted transfers to control 
moral hazard behaviour. Our methodology accomplishes this goal by investigating the 
relationship between the proportion of a donor’s tied aid in total transfers and a 
recipient country’s level of governance. 
                                                 
36 We do not examine the effect of the proportion of tied aid on growth and poverty reduction nor do 
we examine whether the quality of political institutions, as captured by measures of governance  
such as ours, cause growth (Glaeser et al, 2004). These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and 
are irrelevant for our purposes. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportion of Partially Tied 
Multilateral Aid 
0.3190288 0.3355069 0.0000397 0.99999 
Proportion of Fully Tied Bilateral 
Aid 
0.1867267 0.2176963 0 1 
Proportion of Partially Tied 
Bilateral Aid 
0.0468941 0.1021083 0 1 
Proportion of All Tied Bilateral 
Aid 
0.2251157 0.2265601 0 1 
Freedomhouse Political Rights 
Index 
4.114958 1.948526 1 7 
Freedomhouse Civil Liberties 
Index 
4.216066 1.497244 1 7 
Population (in thousands) 40529.23 151086.2 69.655 1286976 
Real GDP Per capita (in US 
dollars) 
4308.028 4022.596 170.555 25834.03 
 
Notes: For proportions of tied aid, Max and Min refer to the maximum or minimum 
individual (i.e., recipient) values in the data during the 1993-2003 period. These are 
not the maximum or minimum annual averages of these variables during the 1993-
1994 period. The average for each year can be found in figures 2 and 4. The mean is 
calculated over the entire 1993-2003 period. 
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Figure 1: Total Multilateral Aid and Amount Tied (Billions of USD) 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Aid Tied in Total Multilateral Aid 
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Figure 3: Amount of Total Bilateral Aid and Amount Fully and Partially Tied 
(Billions of USD) 
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Figure 4: Proportion of Fully and Partially Tied Aid in Total Bilateral Aid 
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Figure 5: Average values of Freedom House Indices of Governance  
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Note: ordering of indices are reversed so higher values indicate better governance
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Table 2: Proportion of Multilateral Tied Aid 
Dependent variable: log[(partially tied multilateral aid)/(Total multilateral aid)] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CL(t-1) -0.234*  -0.226*  
 (0.122)  (0.125)  
PR(t-1)  -0.185**  -0.178* 
  (0.090)  (0.091) 
log[GDP/CAP(t-1)]   -0.139 -0.180 
   (0.507) (0.508) 
log[POP(t-1)]   0.147 0.439 
   (1.988) (1.972) 
Observations 685 685 671 671 
Number of c_id 115 115 113 113 
F(ξ =0) 7.54*** 7.60*** 5.97*** 6.02*** 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 
 
 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (2) ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively; (3) F(ξ=0) is F-test of joint significance 
of all explanatory variables; (4) Time dummies included. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Proportion of Total Bilateral Tied Aid 
Dependent variable: log[(fully tied bilateral aid + partially tied bilateral aid)/(Total 
bilateral aid)] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CL(t-1) 0.107  0.092  
 (0.074)  (0.076)  
PR(t-1)  0.029  0.024 
  (0.051)  (0.052) 
log[GDP/CAP(t-1)]   -0.024 -0.008 
   (0.280) (0.280) 
log[POP(t-1)]   -2.023* -2.167* 
   (1.145) (1.139) 
Observations 1167 1167 1134 1134 
Number of c_id 119 119 119 119 
F(ξ =0) 23.91*** 23.71** 19.39** 19.27** 
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (2) ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively; (3) F(ξ =0) is F-test of joint significance 
of all explanatory variables; (4) Time dummies included. 
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Table 4: Proportion of Fully Tied Bilateral Aid 
Dependent variable: log[(fully tied bilateral aid)/(Total bilateral aid)] 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CL(t-1) 0.092  0.075  
 (0.089)  (0.091)  
PR(t-1)  -0.033  -0.037 
  (0.061)  (0.062) 
log[GDP/CAP(t-1)]   -0.470 -0.440 
   (0.334) (0.333) 
log[POP(t-1)]   -3.783*** -3.940*** 
   (1.366) (1.358) 
Observations 1167 1167 1134 1134 
Number of c_id 119 119 119 119 
F(ξ=0) 26.78*** 26.69*** 22.29*** 22.26** 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (2) ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 
10 per cent significance levels, respectively; (3) F(ξ=0) is F-test of joint significance 
of all explanatory variables; (4) Time dummies included. 
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 Appendix A 
 
List of Multilateral donors 
 
African Development Bank 
Asian Development Bank 
European Commission 
Inter-American Development Bank 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
United Nations Development Programme 
World Bank 
African Development Fund 
Asian Development Fund 
International Development Association 
United Nations Children's Fund 
United Nations Population Fund 
 
 
List of Bilateral donors 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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